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Book Review
Learning Lessons
Lessons in Censorship: How Schools and Courts
Subvert Students’ First Amendment Rights
(Catherine J. Ross)
Review by NAomi CAHN*
I. Introduction
Public school officials have considerable authority to regulate student
expression within the school community. Although, as a constitutional
matter, students do not forfeit their constitutional rights upon entering
school property, it is not at all clear precisely what rights they do have or
what rights school officials do—or do not—have.1 And defining the scope
of those rights has become even more complicated in the age of the internet.
Schools have claimed authority to regulate what occurs in the classroom,
what is printed in student publications, what appears on students’ t-shirts.
in addition, they often seek to extend their sweep over classroom speech
and curricular submissions, while they also struggle with how to handle
cyberbullying and sexting, forms of online speech that occur both on and
off-campus. Lessons in Censorship provides much needed clarity on all of
these issues.2
the book is both a masterful legal history of students’ rights to free
speech in the public schools3 and a powerful argument for policies that
* Harold H. Green Chair, George Washington University Law School.
1. See, e.g., Kristi L. Bowman, The Government Speech Doctrine and Speech in Schools,
48 WAKe FoReSt L. ReV. 211, 213 (2013) (addressing “the school’s role as creating the next
generation of citizens”).
2. CAtHeRiNe J. RoSS, LeSSoNS iN CeNSoRSHiP: HoW SCHooLS ANd CoURtS SUBVeRt
StUdeNtS’ FiRSt AmeNdmeNt RiGHtS (2015) [hereinafter LeSSoNS].
3. As Ross notes early in the book, the focus is on public schools because the schools, their
employees, and elected school boards are public, so subject to specific constitutional
requirements. Id. at 4.
535
Published in Family Law Quarterly, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Fall 2015) p. 535–544.
© 2015 by the American Bar Association. All Rights Reserved.
536 Family Law Quarterly, Volume 49, Number 3, Fall 2015
respect the Constitution, public schools, children, and their parents.
Although the issues explored in the book are typically not addressed in a
basic family law class or practice, they are, nonetheless, issues that go to
the core of parental rights and family law. thus, the book is a signifiant
contribution to the field of family law.4
its comprehensive history of student free speech begins with the founding
of our nation and ends with today. the book analyzes just how and why this
history remains critical today for both jurisprudential and pragmatic
purposes. Understanding and appreciating this history provides a framework
not just for how public school officials should approach students’ rights to
free speech both on and off campus but also for more general concerns—
beyond the schoolhouse door—about what free speech really means in
contemporary America. moreover, the book does so in a way that should be
accessible to a variety of audiences, going beyond judges, lawyers, and law
students, to anyone concerned about public school education and civil
liberties, regardless of any preexisting background in law.
At the end, the book offers a convincing set of core principles for how
to resolve issues that have troubled courts for at least a century5 and that are
arising in new ways as schools cope with the changing media for student
speech. in the first section of this review, i explore the book’s content and,
in the second section, i address the relationship between that content and
family law more generally.
II. The Book
Lessons in Censorship covers a wide territory, historically, culturally,
and legally. Ross begins by explaining the three unifying stories underlying
the book. the first story is about the types of disputes that are at the core
of the legal battles around student free speech. the free-speech disputes
range from the wearing of clothing that expresses a symbolic message (the
ability of students to wear black armbands to school to protest United States
involvement in war)—Tinker v. Des Moines,6 to the coverage by a high-
school newspaper of student drug usage, to the parameters of sexting (off-
premises, online computerized messages addressing sex). Students whose
free speech rights are at issue are conservative, liberal, religious, atheist,
4. it is also a contribution to the field of constitutional law, but i leave that discussion for
others.
5. And, although these cases are common, they are decided with little guidance from the
Supreme Court. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Abandoning the Guidance Function: morse V
Frederick, 2007 SUP. Ct. ReV. 205, 208-09 (2007)(“cases involving speech in the schools are
overwhelmingly more common in the state and federal inferior courts than are cases dealing with
obscenity, indecency, incitement to or advocacy of unlawful activity, defamation, commercial
advertising, campaign finance, and any of a host of other First Amendment subjects”).
6. tinker v. des moines indep. Cmty. Sch. dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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racist, sexist, feminist—they span a range of different and competing
perspectives, but all have been subject to some type of potential restriction
or discipline. these disputes provide the basis for the second interwoven
narrative, which is the development of the law to student free speech. the
third core theme is why the other stories matter. the stories matter, Ross
argues, because they show the “failure of schools to fulfill their role of
fostering constitutional values.”7 So, when public schools do not respect a
student’s free speech, this affects not just the individuals whose rights are
being challenged, but also undermines the role that public schools play—
for almost ninety percent of American students—in educating students
about citizenship and democracy.
the first section of the book (two chapters) is devoted to elucidating the
U. S. Supreme Court’s approach to student free speech. the book begins
by briefly tracing the history of the speech clause, enshrined in the first few
clauses of the Bill of Rights: “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech.” Prior to the early twentieth century, with enactment of
the espionage Act of 1917 during World War i, the federal government
had enacted few laws restricting freedom of speech. Consequently, the
development of the jurisprudence of free speech has occurred primarily
over the last century. in one of the earliest cases involving students, in
1940, the Supreme Court rejected the claims of Jehovah’s Witnesses that
they were entitled to a religious exemption from reciting the Pledge of
Allegiance in school.8 three years later, in Barnette,9 the court reversed its
decision, and that case provides the true starting point for the book’s
exploration of free speech in public schools. Barnette is a landmark case in
First Amendment rights, and the first to establish that the Constitution
protects children who are in a public school.10
Since Barnette, Ross notes, although schools, school district officials,
and other courts have repeatedly dealt with student free speech rights, the
Supreme Court has only directly addressed the issue in four other cases,
the first of which was Tinker v. Des Moines.
if Lessons in Censorship has a star, it is Tinker, discussed in depth in the
first chapter, and with numerous reappearances throughout the book. to
justify interference with student speech, Tinker requires school officials to
“show that the speech create[s] a reasonable apprehension of material
disruption or collide[s] with the rights of others.”11 Ross labels the Tinker
7. RoSS, LeSSoNS, supra note 2, at 4.
8. minnersville School dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
9. W. Virginia State Bd. of educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
10. RoSS, LeSSoNS, supra note 2, at 20.
11. Id. at 33.
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standard “demanding,”12 while it is somewhat lower than the strict scrutiny
applied to potential infringements of adults’ speech rights, it still recognizes
that students have rights when they pass through the doors of the school.
in the remainder of Section i, Ross analyzes the three subsequent cases
in which a more conservative Supreme Court cut back on the rights
seemingly established in Tinker, not by overruling Barnette or Tinker, but
by creating a series of exceptions. Ross again places these decisions within
the larger context of the Court’s approach to children’s rights generally,
showing how the speech cases fit into a pattern of limiting children’s rights.
in the 1986 case of Bethel School District v. Fraser,13 the Court held that
schools may censor lewd speech. matthew Fraser had given a student-
government-nominating speech on behalf of a friend that was filled with
sexual double-entendre; the content of the speech was not objectionable,
but the manner in which the speech was delivered subjected the student to
discipline. then, two years later, in Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier,14 which involved prior restraint of a student newspaper, the
Court held that schools may control “school-sponsored speech.” that is,
speech that bears the school’s imprimatur can be censored unless the
school’s actions do not have a legitimate educational purpose. As Ross
explains, while Tinker protected student speech, Hazelwood seems to
protect school administrators.15 in its most recent opinion, the 2007 case of
Frederick v. Morse16 (“Bong Hits for Jesus”), the Court—through five
separate opinions—allowed censorship of student speech that advocated
the use of illegal drugs. overall, these three cases set limits on Tinker’s
protections, allowing schools to censor speech if the speech is lewd, when
it is school-sponsored and the censorship is reasonably related to a
legitimate pedagogical goal, or if advocating the use of an illegal substance
and is not political. otherwise it can be limited only if it would lead to a
material disruption of school operations or interfere with another person’s
rights (Tinker). Ross rues this “incoherence,” which “has undermined the
simpler regime of a single standard that sent a clear message of respect for
the speech rights of students.”17
in its middle section, Lessons in Censorship focuses on how schools and
lower courts apply these standards to contemporary controversies. As she
describes the cases, Ross argues that while the Court does indeed recognize
schools’ increased authority to censor and punish student expression,
school authorities have exceeded even this more permissive standard. She
12. Id.
13. Bethel Sch. dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
14. Hazelwood Sch. dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
15. RoSS, LeSSoNS, supra note 2 at 52.
16. morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
17. RoSS, LeSSoNS, supra note 2, at 65–66.
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suggests that school officials have pushed Fraser beyond its generally
understood application to lewd expression and innuendo to cover what she
labels “sans-gêne” speech, that is, speech that is not necessarily lewd, but
is made by someone who “either does not understand what is expected in
civil society or disregards it entirely without embarrassment,” a situation
that Ross tartly suggests is “commonly seen in adolescents.”18 She
distinguishes between sans-gêne speech in public at a school-sponsored
gathering, which might be regulated under Fraser or Hazelwood, and
speech used to express insubordination, which can only be legitimately
regulated under Tinker, and private forms of speech (muttering an expletive
to oneself after missing a school bus home) or potentially offensive
language used in the classroom, which schools have punished, although
such incidents are much less likely to satisfy the Tinker standard of material
disruption.
in addition to using Fraser to expand their authority, school officials
also have used Hazelwood’s “school-sponsored” speech standard to restrict
student speech in ways that Ross argues are inappropriate. For example,
she argues that “Bong Hits 4 Jesus” could not legitimately be deemed to be
a sentiment that carried the school’s imprimatur, so a school principal could
not use Hazelwood as a basis for prohibiting it. moreover, schools have
censored performances, school publications, and classroom speech that
could in no way be associated with the school. While Ross notes that school
officials might legitimately be confused because of the vagueness of the
Supreme Court’s guidance,19 she also suggests that schools have not even
complied with the guidance that is clear in the Court’s opinions.
in the third section of the book (roughly half of the volume), Ross returns
to Tinker, probing its contemporary meaning and its continued utility in
protecting students’ First Amendment rights. each of the four chapters in
this section analyzes particular types of speech that have been restricted,
using Tinker as grounding for evaluating the validity of the school officials’
actions. She argues that schools have overreacted to the potential for
“material disruption,” by, for example, silencing political speech that may
pose little risk of any type of disruption. Although many courts then prove
to be overly deferential to the decisions of school officials, applying more
permissive standards that inappropriately curtail students’ free speech
rights, some courts do appropriately protect students’ expression. She
suggests that, in evaluating potential risk, it is useful to consider the
imminence of the risk, its severity, and the proportionality of the imposed
punishment.20
18. Id. at 72.
19. Id. at 98.
20. Id. at 143.
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Aside from the risk of material disruption, Tinker contemplates that
schools may regulate speech that conflicts with the “rights of others.” into
this category falls speech based on group attributes, such as race or sexual
orientation, as well as verbal bullying directed to individuals. the potential
damage to rights of others occurs in two contexts (explored in two separate
chapters): speech that occurs at school and the comparatively new forum
of online speech that occurs outside of school, such as electronic bullying
and sexting. the speech at the core of this form of regulation typically takes
the form of hateful expressions, testing the First Amendment’s requirement
of tolerance of different forms of speech. indeed, Ross argues that schools
repeatedly err in their effort to protect “others” from hurtful words and
ideas that would otherwise be protected by the First Amendment. Listeners
can be protected from speech that violates civil or criminal laws, but
schools go well beyond that, she claims. For example, schools may have
codes that bar hate speech or loosely defined harassment; while harassment
can be penalized, hate speech and verbal bullying may actually be subject
to protection.
Looking outside of the school speech context, Ross explores regulation
of hate speech more generally and suggests ways that school officials
might constitutionally draw distinctions to silence harassing speech while
respecting students’ rights. Rather than censor speech, for example, she
suggests that schools might offer sensitivity courses and implement
proactive efforts that encourage student tolerance.21 She proposes that
schools and the courts use an “infringement matrix” to evaluate whether
speech has interfered substantially with a student’s access to education;
the matrix would include a variety of factors, such as the level of aggres-
siveness, whether it was pervasive, and whether it was targeted.22
At the end, the book turns to the relationship between the First
Amendment’s religion clauses and the speech clause, focusing on the rights
of students seeking to express religious viewpoints. As is true throughout
this area of law, the doctrines are confusing. indeed, some schools have
imposed undue restrictions on students’ religious speech, while others have
promoted religious speech.23 the test that Ross proposes summarizes her
approach more generally: “Unwelcome religious exhortations are no
different analytically from group disparagement and other unwelcome ideas
discussed in this book. they are protected unless the school can permissibly
regulate them under school speech doctrine.”24
21. Id. at 204.
22. Id. at 195.
23. As shown by the book’s discussion of cases arising under the federal equal Access Act—
statutory protection that covers certain student groups, ranging from Bible study gatherings to
LGBt advocacy clubs—this covers a variety of forms of student speech.
24. Id. at 277.
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in the concluding chapter, Ross steps back from the “morass of student
speech rights,”25 and offers her vision of how schools can engage in “living
liberty” by serving as models for respecting constitutional rights.
Accordingly, she provides concrete suggestions for how to improve
schools’ responses to student speech. these range from recommendations
that education schools offer at least one overview of the legal aspects of
student speech rights to the posting in each principal’s office of a diagram
setting out appropriate responses to student exercise of free speech (she
gives an example of such a poster).26 indeed, school administrators, parents,
and students—and courts—should, after reading the book, have the
guidance they need to find the appropriate balance between maintaining
order and respecting speech. moreover, so should students have a better
understanding of just what they can—and cannot do during school as well
as off-campus.
in pulling together the three different narratives of how culture wars play
out in student speech, of the history and contemporary status of legal
jurisprudence on students’ First Amendment rights, and of how schools
should be fulfilling their democratic role, the book is a magnificent legal
history of the lack of respect for student free speech rights by overzealous
school officials, and the confusing court decisions that have attempted to
balance child and state. indeed, because her focus is on public schools,
Ross devotes most of the book to children and the state, and less to parents
(that may be because the book is 300 pages already!).27
thus, controversies in which parents have sought to censor which books
are read in the classroom receive short shrift,28 but she does discuss teacher
speech in the classroom and related issues. indeed, she notes that free
speech rights emphatically belong to children and, in her extensive
research, found only one case that considered a parent’s right to consent to
a child’s claimed speech right.29
25. Id. at 287.
26. Id. at 294.
27. thus, Ross does not fully address the scope and location[s] of parents’ rights and their
relationship to the state. See, e.g., Laura Rosenbury, Between Home and School, 155 U. PA. L.
ReV. 833 (2007). Ross does briefly discusses the allocation of authority between parents and
state in the context of off-campus speech, RoSS, LeSSoNS, supra note 2, at 210. the related
question of whether school officials stand in loco parentis was the basis of two concurrences in
Frederick. Alito, 127 S. Ct. at 2637; thomas, 127 S. Ct. at 2630.
28. Ross notes that these have been well covered elsewhere. For one recent exploration, see
dAVid K. SHiPLeR, FReedom oF SPeeCH: miGHtieR tHAN tHe SWoRd (2015). While these issues
do not involve students’ rights to speak, they do involve the role of the schools in exposing
students to numerous viewpoints as well as the autonomy of schools to make their own decisions
about what is appropriate for students.
29. Frazier v. Winn, 535 F. 1279, 1285 (8th Cir. 2008), discussed at p. 290. the case involved
a Florida statute that allowed parental control over a child’s recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance.
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Ross does not hide her perspective on students’ rights or the appropriate
duties of public schools. throughout the book is strong support for the
ongoing vitality of Tinker’s promise for the rights of student free speech
and respect for the role of public schools in creating thoughtful citizens of
democracy. the number of cases involving restrictions on student speech
is overwhelming, but Ross admirably sorts through them and develops a
useful—and, for many readers (including this one), a compelling—
taxonomy. Reasonable minds—and courts—might differ on the extent to
which Tinker protects this speech, and Ross does acknowledge the
perspectives of those who disagree with her. (they might, however, believe
that her approach is too dismissive of their legitimate efforts to prevent
disruption and maintain order in the schools and to teach students proper
standards of decency and citizenship, although they will still learn much.)
the stories she tells, however, persuasively make the case that students’
free speech rights are not being adequately respected, and that schools, as
well as the legal system, should do more to protect student speech.
III. The Book in the Family Law Context
At a number of law schools, the family law curriculum includes two core
courses: one focused on adult relationships, such as marriage, divorce and
its consequences (alimony, property distribution, custody, and child
support), as well as nomarital partnerships, and a second focused on the
family, child, and state triad, typically including the child abuse and neglect
system, adoption, and children’s rights.30 Lessons in Censorship clearly fits
within that second course, and it also has resonance for the adult-
relationship-focused course.
First, for the children-focused course, the narrative that Ross provides
place students’ free speech rights in the larger context of children’s rights
vis-à-vis the state generally. of course, the relationship between education,
parents, and children has been at the core of family law jurisprudence since
Meyer31 and Pierce,32 and Lessons in Censorship provides another
perspective on those issues. moreover, Ross integrates other juvenile rights
30. there are also distinct casebooks for each. See, e.g., doUGLAS ABRAmS, SARAH RAmSey,
& SUSAN mANGoLd, CHiLdReN ANd tHe LAW (5th ed. 2014); ABRAmS, CAHN et AL.,
CoNtemPoRARy FAmiLy LAW (4th ed. 2015). of course, some schools combine the two courses,
and some family law casebooks attempt to cover both topics. Family law practice more typically
involves the private law issues, such as contracts between cohabitants or married couples,
building families, etc. Particularly during child custody disputes, however, children’s rights
become more significant. Ross’s perspective is informed by the fact that she teaches both courses,
and has written on custody issues in both the private and public contexts.
31. meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
32. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); see Carmen Green, Note, Educational
Empowerment: A Child’s Right to Attend Public School, 103 Geo. L.J. 1089, 1133 (2015).
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cases into her analysis of the Court’s zigs and zags in free speech. thus, in
tracing the Supreme Court’s route from Barnette to Tinker, she takes
account of developments in the juvenile court context,33 showing how
student free speech rights have expanded and contracted in concert with
other child-centered rights. indeed, she is the first scholar to relate Justice
Fortas’s contribution in cases like In re Gault to his authorship of the Tinker
decision.
the tension between parental rights over children and the considerable
power the state asserts over minors plays out throughout Ross’s book. the
expression that gets children into trouble at school often reflects
controversial or unpopular views they learned at home (like showing the
Confederate flag or proclaiming LGBt persons are “sinners” or,
alternatively, that they have rights), but parents who chose public school
lose control over why and how schools discipline their offspring. this
tension, Ross shows, is at its most pronounced when schools discipline
students for off-campus expression, as they increasingly try to do.
Second, there are lessons for the adult-focused course. Children’s rights
issues, while often less explicitly discussed, recur throughout the family
law course in cases ranging from Michael H34 (did Victoria have any rights
to a relationship with her father?) to Newdow35 (did the father have any
right to make constitutional claims on behalf of his child?). moreover, the
role of the child’s voice is particularly important in custody proceedings;
understanding the rights of children provides support for respecting their
role and choices. Lessons in Censorship reminds parents not to discount
children’s autonomy and supports courts’ considerations of the children’s
preferences and needs. moreover, any discusssion of family policy—in
either course—should address the role of public education.
IV. Conclusion
Lessons in Censorship celebrates freedom of speech in the public
schools, highlighting that what students learn about censorship, through
and at their schools, is at the core of learning to be a citizen. She documents
the difficulties of public schools as they grapple with what to do not only
about speech in the classroom but also about off-campus speech, such as
33. RoSS, LeSSoNS, supra note 2, at 22–23.
34. michael H. v. Gerald d., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
35. elk Grove Unified Sch. dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004). the father claimed a right
to inculcate his daughter with his religious beliefs as part of his challenge to the recitation of the
Pledge in public schools, id. at 15, but the Court held that he lacked standing to bring the lawsuit
because his daughter’s mother had “a form of veto power.” Id. at 24 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
to see how Newdow is used in a basic family law course, see ABRAmS et al., supra note 30, at
ch. 13.
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texting and sexting. Although strongly defending the importance of student
speech, Ross also highlights the dangers of “material disruption” that such
speech can sometimes pose. Her thorough exploration of our past and of
how to move forward, of how school officials should fulfill their role of
promoting democracy—and of how they have failed—can help guide
schools, courts, and the rest of us.
